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Abstract
Information security in Process-aware Information System (PAIS) re-
lies on many factors, including security of business process and the under-
lying system and technologies. Moreover, humans can be the weakest link
that creates pathway to vulnerabilities, or the worst enemy that compro-
mises a well-defended system. Since a system is as secure as its weakest
link, information security can only be achieved in PAIS if all factors are
secure. In this paper, we address two research questions: how to conduct
a cross-layer security analysis that couple security concerns at business
process layer as well as at the technical layer; and how to include human
factor into the security analysis for the identification of human-oriented
vulnerabilities and threats. We propose a methodology that supports the
tracking of security interdependencies between functional, technical, and
human aspects which contribute to establish a holistic approach to infor-
mation security in PAIS. We demonstrate the applicability with a scenario
from the payment card industry.
Keywords: Information Security; Process-aware Information Systems; Cross-
layer Analysis; Human-oriented Security Analysis;
1 Introduction
Humans are the weakest link when it comes to security in everyday business
processes (e.g., [26] and [35]). For example, the 2014 data breach report of
[40] shows that as of 2013, more than 85% of data breaches stem from exter-
nal agents, more than 10% from insiders and around 1% from business part-
ners. Research shows that for example insiders (i.e., employees) intentionally
circumvent security measures for three reasons ([22]): First, employees lack
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security-awareness and have no incentive to apply security-compliant behavior.
Secondly, employees skip security procedures in order to fulfill their job effec-
tively. The cost of adherence to compliance is too high. Lastly, compliance is
impracticable and employees choose different ways to fulfill their jobs. However,
this non-compliant behavior increases the likelihood for vulnerabilities because
it is hard to control (see [5] and [42]). While business still keeps running, such
behavior is also difficult to detect until an incident occurs.
Business process can be seen as a vehicle to integrate the human, functional,
and technical perspective in an enterprise. As humans are an essential part for
fulfilling and managing business processes [20], it is important to incorporate
them when it comes to security in business processes. Although security in
Process-aware Information Systems (PAIS) is a interdisciplinary research field
that faces many challenges such as human orientation or an agreement of tech-
nology, it often centers on the specification of access control mechanisms (cf.
[24]). However, these mechanisms are often neither evaluated with users nor
directly visible to the user and find ways to bypass it (e.g., [5] and [2]). Most
research that incorporates human involvement focuses on the design and speci-
fication of security requirements in process modeling languages via extensions.
For example, modeling extensions for UML or BPMN (e.g., [45] and [34]) exist
that represent specific restrictions such as privacy, integrity, or confidentiality
requirements on tasks. However, the concrete implementation on the techni-
cal level or user studies that evaluate the e.g., comprehensibility or cognitive
effectiveness are often missing.
In this paper we aim to address two main research questions: (a) how to con-
duct a cross-layer security analysis that couples security concerns at business
process layer as well as at the technical layer; and (b) how to include human
factor into the security analysis for the identification of human-oriented vulner-
abilities and threats. With question (a), we target to identify security concerns
that go beyond the business process and to investigate technical aspects and
human aspects that contribute to a thorough and systematic security analysis.
Question (b) aims to provide a holistic view that shows that human involve-
ment is as important as technical aspects when it comes to securing business
processes.
In order to address questions (a) and (b), security is investigated as a cross-
layer concern in PAIS architectures and a multilayer PAIS architecture model is
provided that incorporates humans as essential factor spanning across the busi-
ness process, system design, and implementation layers. The multilayer PAIS
model is used as an input to generate a method for a human-oriented security
analysis that contains four steps: business process analysis, function mapping,
technical analysis, and human factor analysis. Moreover, we analyze and eval-
uate our method with a scenario from the payment card industry. With this
examination, we show that humans are a key factor in the design, development,
and execution of secure business processes. The approach follows the conceptual
framework set out in [10].
The method proposed in this paper contributes to security engineering in
PAIS but also to other research disciplines (e.g., human-centric PAIS [20]). We
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envision that it can be used for systematic, risk-driven security analysis of PAIS
and guiding the design and development of the system.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 analyzes security in business
processes based on a multilayer model that incorporates technical and human
aspects. Section 3 describes the method for the human-oriented security analysis
with an application scenario from the payment card industry. The main find-
ings, limitations, and impact on research and practice are outlined in Section 4.
Section 5 describes related work and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Security in PAIS Architectures
Security in business processes is an interdisciplinary field that links security
mechanisms from the business process management and security research com-
munity (cf. [24]). When considering security from a holistic, engineering point
of view, we have to assess not only the system and the architecture, but also the
human-related aspects of the business process. To establish a structured view
of the PAIS architecture, three layers that are relevant to security analysis can
be identified (e.g., [3]):
• the business process layer represents the functional organization,
• the system design layer centers on the specification of the system ar-
chitecture and its components,
• and the implementation layer incorporates the technologies utilized to
implement the system.
In addition, a fourth human layer is considered orthogonally to the other three
layers. In the following, we will discuss each layer in more detail.
2.1 Business Process Layer
The business process layer centers on the processes when organizing and man-
aging work in an organization (cf. [11]), i.e. the functional organization. This
includes not only the process participants but also the outcomes and the cus-
tomer values of processes. Business processes can be found in every business
domain such as in banks, hospitals, or retail stores. Attacking a business process
requires full or at least partial knowledge of the participants in a process and
on the activities performed.
2.2 System Design Layer
System design defines system architecture, system components and their in-
terfaces, and data. Putting together, they realize the specification of business
processes. System design can be done at different levels of abstraction, from
conceptualization and modeling of systems to selection of concrete technologies
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and system artifacts. System design follows engineering principles which usually
includes analysis, design, and verification.
Generally, a system architect needs to consider common ICT components
such as hardware, software, database and networks. Within the system archi-
tecture, software components such as applications and services perform various
actions defined by a business process. During the design, the input/output to
the software components and their behaviors are considered to a great extent to
ensure that all components will behave according to the design. Also considered
are the component-component and component-user interactions.
With respect to information security, all of the variants at the system design
layer can have profound security implications on business process security, as
well as on system implementation. To achieve security by design, a set of security
controls need to be analyzed and planned for securing business processes (cf.
[24]). Besides, security testing can be carried out at design time (cf. [28]).
2.3 Implementation Layer
The implementation layer is concerned with the technologies utilized to imple-
ment the system design and covers an extensive set of technologies (e.g., web
services, programming languages), PAIS products (e.g., SAP, ERP, or Oracle),
and protocols (e.g., transport protocols, networks) which can be utilized to im-
plement and execute business processes. Hence, the underlying technology is a
key factor when it comes to security in PAIS. For example, a web service-based
application system can be attacked with e.g., denial of service, XML, or SOAP
attacks (cf. [19, 41]). With the increase in use of different technologies and sys-
tem complexity, the number of vulnerabilities increases and therefore the attack
surface and attack vector.
Depending on the technology used, different outsiders might be more inter-
ested or motivated to attack. For instance, a web-based application might be an
easier target for non-professional (e.g., script kiddies) and professional hackers
than a closed system (which might be only interesting for hired professionals).
2.4 Human Layer
In business processes, manual (i.e. performed by a human) and automated tasks
(i.e. performed by a machine or program) are distinguished. Typically, humans
access PAIS based on their roles that represent job functions or organizational
affiliations ([13]). To clearly identify human involvement and its impact on se-
curity, we analyze human activities based typical roles they take in business
processes (see [11, 43, 21, 32]). Typically, managers (i.e. chief process officer,
business engineers, and process owners) use dashboards or control panels to
evaluate and track business processes (such as handover time between tasks).
Process designers, system architects, and developers are responsible for the de-
sign and implementation of business process models and systems and the set
up of security controls. Process participants and knowledge workers actively
participate in business processes. Subjects participate passively in the business
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process (e.g., as a patient in a medical procedure). Business partners take part
in a business process choreography where public views on the internal processes
are visible to the partners. Each business partner has to comply with a defined
set of rules or a set of contractual agreements (see [43]). This implicates also
security-related policies ([6, 17].
Employee, Business partner, Contractor, Nation state, Professional hacker,
Non-professional hacker is a list of attacker roles adapted from commonly used
attacker types in security literature and practice, and the threat agents library
defined in [7]. From an information security point of view, humans are the main
actor that passively or actively influences the security of a system. Generally,
humans have two types of “negative” influences on security: they either intro-
duce vulnerabilities in terms of flaws or mistakes in the design, implementation,
configuration, and operation of the system ([23]), or pose threats as attackers
to exploit the vulnerabilities and comprise the security of the system ([26, 31]).
Obviously, different roles typically connected to a business process are able to
introduce vulnerabilities and launch attacks. For example, social engineering
attacks are well known for acquiring passwords or other information from hu-
mans in order to gain access to information systems ([15]). Hence, common
tasks in risk assessment are to analyze and estimate how likely a part of the
system could be attacked, by whom, and with what means. Although actual
attacks are often done by crafted input, computer instructions or programs (e.g.
malware), the origins of the attacks can always be linked to humans. Therefore,
identifying potential attackers and their roles is crucial for security analysis of
PAIS.
3 Cross-Layer Security Analysis
This section proposes a methodology for cross-layer security analysis of business
processes including a human-oriented perspective. The methodology is based
on the PAIS architecture (cf. Section 2) and divided into four steps. Each step
analyzes one layer, i.e., business process analysis, function mapping, technical
analysis, and human factor analysis. The novelty of the methodology is its
holistic nature. Each of the layers contains different and relevant information
for security analysis. Moreover, the interrelations between the layers are an
interesting source for security analysis. Take for example data flow. There
is a process data flow which connects tasks at the business process level by
their input and output parameters. In addition, data is exchanged between
the process tasks (business process layer) and the invoked applications (system
layer), e.g., web services. Based on the methodology, security of process-oriented
applications can be investigated. It can be also used for security compliance
checking.
In the following, we will use a running example to examine each step of the
analysis.
Example 1 (Credit Card Blockage and Renewal) Figure 1 displays a credit
card blockage and renewal request (using BPMN notation, cf. [32]). The process
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Figure 1: Example 1: Credit Card Blockage and Renewal
contains several participants: a client that has a credit card, a bank that issues
credit cards, and a printing company that prints and sends out the cards. In the
example process, a client orders the blockage of a credit card due to card theft or
other reasons. Therefore, the client requests the suspension of the previous card
and orders a new credit card by signing a request form. The customer service
receives the notification of the blocked card, checks the credit status, and blocks
the credit card. Furthermore, a binding of duty (BoD) constraint is imposed
on the Check credit card status and Block previous credit card tasks,
i.e. both tasks have to be performed by the same person. To verify the request,
two employees of the customer service have to check and sign the request. This
procedure is often called “four-eyes-principle” or separation of duty (SoD) con-
straint (see [4]). After a successful verification, the request is submitted to the
credit card management department that processes the request and informs the
printing company. After several working days later the client receives a personal
identification number (PIN), a credit card, and an additional notification letter
by mail (with several days difference between the letters).
3.1 Business Process Analysis
Analyzing the business process layer identifies the following information: process
tasks as functional building blocks, process participants and their roles, security-
related constraints, information about the system infrastructure, and possible
business collaborations. Let us illustrate this based on the running example:
(a) Identify participants and their roles: Usually, organizational information is
(partly) available in business process models. Depending on the notation,
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it might be represented in a different way. In BPMN as standard nota-
tion, pools represented the different involved participants (organizations,
partners), specifically, client, bank, and printing company in Figure 1.
Furthermore, roles of process participants are specified as swimlanes, here
the customer service and the credit card management for the bank. If
information on participants and roles is not (sufficiently) available, it can
be acquired via, e.g., interviews (cf. [24]).
(b) Analyze security-related constraints such as Separation of Duty (SoD) and
Binding of Duty (BoD) which are realized by access control mechanisms
that perform authentication and authorization of both users and programs
when they access data or use computer resources. In the business process
in Figure 1, a BoD constraint is defined for tasks Check credit card
status and Block previous credit card to ensure that the same per-
son performs both tasks. In addition, the task Verify request contains
a business rule that states that two different people have to verify the
request. This SoD constraint is imposed to prevent error and fraud (see
[4]).
(c) Denote system infrastructure: The business process layer partly indicates
the IT infrastructure behind the business process. It can be seen from
Figure 1 that a card database exists that stores the credit card data. Fur-
thermore, the figure contains automated tasks that connect, for example,
the bank with the printing company.
(d) Register business collaborations: The usage of pools in the figure shows
that this business process is a collaboration and therefore might require
security measures (e.g., encryption or digital signatures).
3.2 Function Mapping
The function mapping investigates the functional building blocks (i.e. tasks) of a
business process and their incorporation in the system design architecture. Note
that we are aware that large-scale business processes can contain a vast amount
of tasks and the complexity and effort of such analysis would increase quickly.
However, in order to minimize the complexity, we recommend to perform the
functional mapping and further steps only on tasks that can be classified as
security-critical1.
Assume that task BlockPreviousCreditCard has been identified as being
security-critical. Figure 2 displays its function mapping. The main purpose
of the task is to block the credit card and write the required data to a card
database. The first layer in Figure 2 displays the constraints at business process
layer that can be derived based on the business process model in Figure 1. In
1In order to determine which tasks are security-critical, for example, the method proposed
by [39] can be followed where the decision bases on a discussion between business and security
analyst.
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particular, constraint C1 assigns a role to the task and C2 defines a BOD
constraint (see previous section).
Based on these requirements, we can adopt the function into the system
design layer where the systems are outlined and their interconnections. In par-
ticular, a database, a PAIS, an authentication module, and a user interface (UI)
are identified. The PAIS and database contain modules (e.g., access control)
that should align with the constraints defined in the business process layer. It
can be seen from Figure 2 that depicting the security-aware components and
their interactions just for a single task is challenging as it includes different
software components that interact with each other.
3.3 Technical Analysis
Based on the system design in the function mapping, the technical analysis is
concerned with the deployment and execution of a single task in a business
process.
Continuing with Example 1, the system infrastructure is explicitly defined
in the implementation layer in Figure 2. In particular, the UI and the au-
thentication service enforce a proper authentication and authorization of users.
Furthermore, a workflow system interacts with a database in order to store the
8
processed data. Note that in this example, the role accessing the database is not
CustomerService but is WorkflowSystem. Hence, the access control restrictions
C1 and C2 defined in the business process layer are eventually enforced in the
workflow system. The user role information is typically not transmitted to the
database application.
The actual realization of the functions and system depends on the exist-
ing enterprise IT environment, available technologies and resources. The result
is very likely to be a combination of vendor-specific BPM software and cus-
tomized software implementations. Figure 3 shows an example of the data flow
diagram (DFD) of the system that is often used in threat modeling (cf. [38])
for identifying potential IT security threats. All interactions with the user hap-
pen on the Browser. A Web server responds to user requests and data input
with constructed web content. The Authentication Server handles a user’s login
requests to the system. The LDAP Directory stores the user directory informa-
tion. The BPM Server is where the workflow engine locates which handles the
workflow and access control and constraints specified in the BPM rules in the
BPM Repository. The Business Application Server hosts various applications
or web services that are invoked by the BPM server. The applications on the
Business Application Server read and write to the Card database through the
Data Management System which provides access control to the Card Database,
among other functions.
The access control restrictions C1 and C2 are thus the function mappings
of the requirements to various components and sub-systems. However, this
imposes several risks for security: First of all, the constraints defined on the
business process layer and drafted on the system design layer are not consistently
transferred to the implementation layer. At implementation level, the access
control restrictions such as C1 and C2 are not enforced in the database. The
access control restrictions are specified and enforced in the workflow system but
the database does not distinguish the updates from the workflow system; they
are all made by the role WorkflowSystem. Hence, a human-specific verification
of the data entries in a database cannot be performed – only based on the
logs of the workflow system. Furthermore, this opens the possibility to access
the database given access control restrictions (such as role assignments and
constraints) in the workflow system were overcome.
From an information security point of view, more security risks need to be
considered. The system might be distributed geographically and across different
trust domains. For example, the main system can be within a Internal Trust
Boundary, the Web server needs to be placed in a Controlled zone (e.g. a De-
military Zone (DMZ)) because it might be subject to various networked attacks
originated from the external entities from the internet. The DFD in Figure 3
identifies the trust boundaries, data flow, and entry points. In a systematic
security analysis, each of the elements need to be considered for security risks.
This means even though the access control constraints from the business pro-
cess layer can be achieved by the functions provided by applications and services
such as authentication and workflow engine, any compromise at the system or
code level can easily subvert these attempts. Therefore, the functional mapping
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Figure 3: Data flow diagram of system architecture
provide a means for consider business process security and information security
at the same time.
3.4 Human Factor Analysis
Table 1 shows example risks and solutions that can be drawn based on the
human-oriented cross-layer analysis. Some of the solutions are common security
practice. However, other solutions raise interesting new research questions, e.g.,
consistency checks of access constraints implemented at different layers.
The human factor is analyzed in terms of the roles (cf. Section 2.4). We
construct the analysis along the components identified through the functional
mapping for task BlockPreviousCreditCard as depicted in Figure 2. Specifi-
cally, a role might introduce a vulnerability or pose a threat for the component
(cf. “negative influences” of humans on security as outlined in Section 2.4).
First of all, as we analyze a specific process task, the roles that are respon-
sible for the entire BPM project, i.e., the BPM group, the Business Engineers,
the Chief process officer, and the Process owners (cf. Section 2.4) are not con-
sidered because they are not directly involved in the business process as shown
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Table 1: Human-oriented Security Analysis: Example Risks and Solutions
Role B S I V T Security risk Solution
Process de-
signers
  misconfiguration of ac-
cess constraints
consistency/compliance
checks
  uncontrolled adap-
tion of access con-
straints/business pro-
cess
implement change con-
trol mechanisms
  uncontrolled administra-
tive changes
implement change con-
trol mechanisms
  miscommunication with
stakeholders
regular workshops
  errors in workflow design correctness and compli-
ance checks
Developers   misconfiguration at ap-
plication level
follow security best
practices and conduct
security audit
  use default password change password in con-
figuration
  deviate from access con-
straints as specified at
process level
conduct cross-layer con-
sistency checks
  introduce vulnerability
in inhouse developed ap-
plication code
follow security best
practices and life cycle
System archi-
tects
  insufficient security con-
trols at different parts of
the system
defense in depth
  incorrect definition of
trust boundary
conduct thorough secu-
rity analysis and using
reference security archi-
tecture
  insufficient protection
against (rare) threats
defense in depth; addi-
tional security controls
for high value assets
  introduce vulnerabilities
in the system design en-
abling user to bypass
BPM rules
conduct cross-layer con-
sistency checks
Knowledge
workers /
Process par-
ticipants
  use weak password security training and
technology support for
password management
  exploit logical flaws in
the workflow
correctness and compli-
ance checks, anomaly
detection at BP level
  inject incorrect data into
the process data context
data flow checks, imple-
ment integrity checks
  inject incorrect data into
the database (via the
PAIS)
data flow checks, con-
sistent integrity checks
between PAIS and
database
Outsiders   launch denial of service
attack
design and implement
resilience measures such
as time out or upper
limit for number of in-
stances
  social engineering and
malware-based attack
security training, change
management, and secu-
rity controls
B: Business Process Level; S: System Design Level; I: Implementation Level;
V: Vulnerability, T: Threat
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in Figure 2. Further on, task BlockPreviousCreditCard neither requires any
interaction with Subjects nor with Partners. Hence, all these roles are not
considered within the analysis.
At design time, mostly the technical staff such as system architects or de-
velopers are involved because they might introduce errors or make bad design
decisions. For example, as software-intensive systems, PAIS often use and inte-
grate off-the-shelf products. Due to complexity and knowledge gap, sometimes
software and their security features are not correctly configured, thus becomes
vulnerable to malicious attacks. For example, not changing the default autho-
rization value of a SAP service might lead to unrestricted access for all authen-
ticated users (see [30]). A tiny implementation mistake in the OpenSSL library
(i.e. the Heartbleed bug) allows an attacker to read sensitive information in a
server’s memory including the server’s private key and other users’ passwords
(cf. [8]).
At runtime, the actual users of PAIS and outsiders can introduce vulnera-
bilities as well as threats. For example, the access point of knowledge workers
or process participants is typically the PAIS. From this point, they can access
and execute business process activities. Knowledge workers have an extensive
knowledge of the business processes and systems and might seek possibilities to
circumvent security controls or exploit knowingly deactivated controls (cf. [12]).
Reconsidering the Heartbleed bug (see [8]), also a hacker as an outsider can ex-
ploit the vulnerability and pose threats to the systems, e.g. by using stolen
credentials to log into the system to compromise the whole security controls.
Besides, insecure day-to-day operations by humans can lead to total failure of se-
curity protections. Social engineering, which targets humans in daily operations
is proved to be quite effective to compromise many high secure systems [16].
Moreover, the attacks at the implementation can impact other layers such as
the system design or the business process layer. For example, if the Heartbleed
bug affected the interaction between the database and the workflow system in
Example 1, the PAIS and the business process itself might have been compro-
mised. On the other hand, bad design choices by the technical staff can intro-
duce vulnerabilities on the implementation level that knowledge workers are not
aware of. For example, if the system architects do not remove the vulnerability
introduced by Heartbleed, the knowledge worker would continue working which
can yield data breaches. While each single role has a different intersection with
the PAIS system, the security implementations can be interrelated. A vulner-
ability or a threat at one point within one layer might have profound impact
or cascading effect on other points at the business process, system design, and
implementation layer. Therefore, the presented methodology can bring a big
picture of the security issues, which helps us to trace the security interdepen-
dency in PAIS at design and runtime and to identify new security issues, in
order to find proper solutions.
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4 Discussion
This section examines the main findings, impact on research and practice, and
the limitations of this paper.
4.1 Main Findings
This paper provides interdisciplinary research that bridges the gap between
BPM/ PAIS and information security research. As security is a cross-layer
concern, this paper investigates how security is embedded in PAIS architectures.
It provides a holistic approach addressing security concerns at the business
process, system design, and implementation layer in a PAIS. Moreover, security
aspects at each layer are analyzed under consideration of human aspects. Using
roles to represent human factors in security analysis gives us a fine-grained grasp
of human involvement in various aspect of PAIS. As our analysis shows, it helps
to transform the abstract notion of “human” into concrete and specific entities
such that we can have more precise analysis related to the security implications
of specific part of the PAIS architecture.
The research conducted in this paper shows that security issues are tightly
interrelated and the impact of a security attack might be difficult to comprehend
without a holistic view on a system. For example, an attack on the implemen-
tation to compromise a password can jeopardize the enforcement of constraints
defined in the business process layer, or a design error by a system architecture
might introduce a vulnerability that creates an opportunity for a disgruntled
employee to circumvent the organizationally posed security controls and con-
straints. Particularly in complex settings with hundreds or thousands of pro-
cess tasks, a systematic and holistic methodology helps to connect the dots and
identify non-obvious security links.
Security in PAIS is a complex issue. A common approach is to create layers
of abstraction, e.g. concentrating issues related to business process, or to soft-
ware security. Our analysis shows it is also important to consider issues at the
interfaces and beyond the abstraction layers.
Overall, the methodology proposed in this paper can be used for
• security analysis
• (security) compliance checks
• security trainings
These usage scenarios will be detailed in the next section.
4.2 Impact on Research and Practice
A main contribution of this paper is the methodology for a cross-layered and
human-oriented security analysis. Researchers and practitioners may use this
analysis as input for further security evaluations such as risk or threat analysis.
For example, the human factor analysis derives a list of internal or external
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attackers that can be used as a list of “suspects” for the IT risk management
(e.g., [37, 33]). The methodology can also serve as input for developing checklists
for systematic (security) compliance checks. Moreover, this approach can serve
as basis for several research directions; the methodology contributes not only
to the security engineering of PAIS but also to research on human-centric PAIS
(see [20]). For instance, the training of process participants can raise security
awareness, can prevent misuse or errors, and can increase the knowledge of
workers in order to fulfill their job functions successfully.
Based on the methodology, security-awareness trainings for different target
groups such as business partners, developers, or managers can be developed.
Furthermore, the result of the analysis can be used for the design and devel-
opment of security controls. In addition, practitioners may use this review for
revisiting security measures in PAIS, e.g., by reevaluating existing security mea-
sures with regard to human factors.
4.3 Limitations
This paper incorporates roles from the BPM and the information security area.
However, we did not include roles from the risk management disciplines (e.g.,
[37, 33]) that focus on risk analysis such as employees/ users or chief security
officers. One reason is that the classification in this paper centered only on roles
from the business process community. It should be noted that some roles from
risk management overlap with the roles outlined in Section 2.4.
The methodology is evaluated with an application scenario. The scenario
should provide an initial guidance how to apply the methodology. However, the
applicability of the methodology is not restricted by any means: For example,
the number of tasks used in the function mapping and technical analysis, the
level of detail for the human factor analysis, or the number of vulnerabilities
and threats assessed can be adapted accordingly to the scenario.
5 Related Work
Humans are an important factor when it comes to information security. Re-
search investigates human users from many perspectives such as trusting, de-
cepting, and hacking humans (cf. [9, 26, 31]). For example, ways to socially
engineer and deceive users in order to acquire information are shown in [26].
Furthermore, humans might circumvent security measures (see [22, 2]). Other
publications such as [35, 23] analyze the outcomes of humans errors and use
it to provide usable and effective security measures. Typically, dependencies
can be used in information security to identify and analyze relations such as
between assets and attackers ([36]) or between objectives and patterns ([18]).
In this paper, we analyze dependencies that go beyond the business process in
a multilayer model.
Several approaches tackle risk analysis for business processes. In [1], risk
patterns for business processes are specified based on BPMN. These patterns
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partly incorporate the human aspect. The security-risk-oriented pattern 4 (SRP
4), for example, explicitly models the role of an attacker which accesses data
in a business process in an unauthorized manner. [1], however, is confined to a
set of five patterns that foresee possible attackers as explicit roles. By contrast,
the approach at hand provides a systematic view on all layers of the system
where potential attackers are not known beforehand. The approach presented
by [39] analyzes a real-world example from the insurance domain with particular
focus on the data flow. Hence, it investigates the connections between the tasks
rather than the tasks. Such cross-task analyses, in general, can be applied
complementary to the function and human-oriented analysis presented in this
paper. Overall, we found that approaches for security in business processes
often concentrate on one aspect such as data flow or security requirements.
A multilayer architecture in [44] contains business, process, integration, soft-
ware, and technology architecture layers. Furthermore, the enterprise architec-
ture is a cross-layer that represents aggregate artifacts and their relationships
across all layers. In this paper, security is also seen as a cross-layer issue. Fur-
thermore, the secure enterprise business model in [29] is based on a modern
enterprise system architecture and contains three layers: First, the business
layer specifies business processes and related organizational aspects. Secondly,
the application layer specifies the services and data schemas for business process
execution. Lastly, the infrastructure layer provides the software and hardware
needed to automate the process execution (e.g., PAIS, databases, or operating
systems). Furthermore, each layer can be split according to timing: design time,
run time, and audit time. I.e. enterprise security and its measures is scattered
across all layers and required at all times (design, run, and audit time). While
the architecture in [29] centers on the technology and the execution time, our
paper provides a methodology that combines technical and human aspects. We
do not consider audit time in this paper since the respective analysis examines
the security impacts on the systems during design- and runtime. To our best
knowledge we are not aware of any other literature that investigates the human
factor in business process security.
Furthermore, a case study on modeling secure transactions is shown in [14].
In particular, the authors use Secure Tropos (see [27]) to model dependencies
between merchants that offer services, banks that requesting the service and
cardholders that own the data. In this paper, we analyze security based on a
payment card industry use case. However, we do not define specific requirements
nor provide a methodology to define security-related artifacts. In fact, we use
this as example to display that security is a issue across all layers. In addition, we
analyze the dependencies between the levels in a multilayer architecture model.
Furthermore in [25], the attentive listener (ATLIST) vulnerability analysis is
provided. This method was mainly developed for service-oriented architectures
that use a plethora of web technologies and SOA-specific standards and targets
SOA-based business processes. Our methodology can be used to determine
prerequisite artifacts for the ATLIST analysis.
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6 Conclusion
Security is as good as its weakest link – the humans – in everyday business
processes. So far, research has neglected to analyze the human factor when it
comes to vulnerabilities and threats in PAIS. This paper proposes a cross-layer
and human-oriented methodology for PAIS. The methodology examines busi-
ness functionality beyond the business process layer and investigates technical
and human aspects that are essential for a thorough examination. With an ap-
plication scenario, we show that even the security analysis for a single business
function results into an assessment of a multilateral interaction between mul-
tiple application components. Overall, the proposed methodology contributes
to the security engineering of PAIS which can be used as a basis to conduct
further security evaluations, systematic compliance checking, and target-group
oriented security trainings. As a next step, the application of the analysis will
be applied to selected real-world business process scenarios.
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